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Intersections:
Sexuality, Cultural Tradition, and the Law
Introduction
Janet E. Halley
This Symposium inhabits two intersections: the intersection linking
sexual  orientation  with  other  axes  of  social  stratification,  and  the
intersection linking the legal future to the legal past, legal reform to
legal  history.  Francisco  Valdes  examines  the relationship  between
sex and gender in Euro-American cultural and legal history to support
a reform proposal on behalf of "sexual minorities";  Robert J. Morris
excavates the cultural history of same-sex relationships in Hawai'i to
support a claim that Hawaiian cultural preservation, mandated by the
Hawai'i State Constitution, includes recognition of same-sex marriage;
and Mary Coombs  and Angela Harris provide  critical  comments on
sociological, affiliative, intellectual, and historiographical intersections
that structure  Morris'  and Valdes'  claims.  Valdes  and Morris  offer
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perhaps the most richly researched and polemically targeted cultural-
historical accounts of sexual orientation  in  the law review literature.
Particularly  with  the  addition  of  Coombs'  and  Harris'  critical
responses, this  Symposium frames  the debate for queer legal history
and historiography.  It should be read under the immemorial motto:
Those who don't study historiography are doomed to repeat it.
The most urgent substantive question  posed by this Symposium  is
the relationship between  discrete systems  of social classification  and
stratification:  What  are  the  relationships  between  sex,  gender,  and
sexual orientation  (Valdes  and Coombs); and between  sexual  orien-
tation and national and native culture (Morris and Harris)?  These are
questions  which,  thanks  to  the  work  of  Kimberl6  Crenshaw  and
Angela  Harris,  we  have  been  accustomed  to  think  of  as  "interse-
ctional"  because  they  inquire  into  the  simultaneous,  interlocked
operation  of semi-autonomous  social and discursive systems.
Claims about intersectionality  can be  euphoric or dysphoric.  The
lead articles in this Symposium propose euphoric models of intersec-
tionality;  the comments propose  dysphoric  ones.  Valdes  argues that
a single  system suppresses  all women and  all "sexual minorities,"  so
the academic, political, and legal disruption of that system is a suitable
goal for  a  harmonious  coalition  of gay  men,  lesbians, women,  and
"sexual  minorities"  generally.  Morris  argues  that the incorporation
of Hawai'i  as  a state of the  United  States  infused U.S. legal culture
with the homophilic traditions of native Hawaiian culture, and so the
academic, political,  and legal  revival of native Hawaiian  culture  is  a
suitable project for a harmonious  coalition of natives and nonnatives
alike.  The comments offer dysphoric corrections: Coombs notices that
Valdes and Morris have made "gay" history from historical records by
and about men  (What about  women? What  about  lesbians?),  while
Harris challenges  Morris'  translation of native history into American
terms  (What  about  the  problems  of  cultural  translation  and  ap-
propriation?).
To abstract a bit: The euphoric claims in this Symposium emphasize
the conjunctive  operation of discrete identity systems and thus make
differently subordinated  people alike in some way;  the happiness of
their implicit social change narrative arises from an appeal to coalition
identity  politics.  The  dysphoric  claims  emphasize  the  disparate,
unrelated,  contradictory,  or  incommensurate  operation  of  discrete
identity systems and thus assert that differently subordinated  people
are  different;  the  unhappiness  of  these  claims  arises  from  their
resolute recognition of political separateness.
The  allocation  of optimism  in  this volume  is  one of  its novelties.
Intersectionality, which  elsewhere  has frowned, wears  a surprisingly
happy  face  here.  In  their  inaugural  statements  of  intersectional
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analysis,  Crenshaw,  Harris,  and  others  were  pointedly  dysphoric:
Black  feminists  noted  that they  didn't  have the  luxury  of  worrying
about gender  only, or about  race  only, because  they  inhabited  the
place where gender and race oppression meet.  The central dysphoric
claim was  that the intersection  of race  and gender  stratification  was
a social and epistemic affliction.  (There was also the dysphoria  with
which  white  feminists  greeted  the  news  that  we  had  made  this
affliction worse  when we called for a movement of women  and thus
rode through the intersection as though it were our own right of way.
But our dismay and shame were  collateral to the central, dismal  fact
of  interlocking  and  reinforcing  mechanisms  of  oppression  and
invisibility  afflicting  a  distinctive  population  as  such.)  Valdes  and
Morris implicitly accept the call for intersectional analysis, and set out
to study sexual orientation identity not in isolation but in the context
of impinging  identity systems.  But they refuse the  dysphoria of the
opening  phases  of  intersectional  analysis:  They  replace  unity  and
difference  with  diversity,  and  supplant  both  hegemonic  claims  to
represent  others  and  particularistic  claims  to  represent  specific
communities with invitations  to coalition  politics.
Coombs and Harris don't dispute the importance of intersections or
the strategic value  of coalitions, but they  do  dispel the warm, fuzzy
feeling  of Valdes'  and  Morris'  euphoria.  "Not  so fast,"  they  say:
"Euphoric  intersectionality  misses  some  methodological  and  even
ethical problems."  Women, and particularly lesbians, have been made
invisible by male writers who subsume them into a generic human, or
a generic gay, identity; reading native culture from a western perspec-
tive may occlude  everything that is distinctive about it; mining native
culture as a source for legal reform can  be a gesture of neo-colonial
appropriation.
Much  of this  critique  will be roughly  familiar  to  anyone who has
studied the semi-secession of feminist legal theory from critical legal
studies  and  of  critical  race  theory  from  both.  Further  novelties
emerge,  however, from  the fact that  this collection  replays familiar
tensions in a new context:  It is  about sexial orientation. Let's admit
it:  Social stratification on the basis  of sexual orientation  or sexuality
is  not much  like  social  stratification  on  the basis  of  race, ethnicity,
class, and sex.  The differences  are both epistemic and metaphysical,
and affect the very possibility of, and modes for, doing intersectional
analysis  involving sexual orientation.
Modes  of knowing  first:  Folk knowledge  supposes  it knows  what
the races and sexes are and who belongs to which one; the ethnicities
don't get on the social or legal map unless they reproduce this feature
of the races; and we're all agreed that it is so much harder to live on
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makes people different.  Even the inaugural essays on intersectionality
presupposed the real existence  of black women,  and their cognitive
authority  to  declare  themselves  to  be  like  each  other  and  unlike
others.  The  project  of  defining  the  sexual  orientations  and  of
assigning people to them, on the other hand, has become a threshold
question in academic and political contexts.  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's
Epistemology of the Closet, David M. Halperin's One Hundred Years
of Homosexuality, and the 1993 debates about military anti-gay policy
all made the same point: The questions "what is homosexuality"  and
"who  is  homosexual"  are profound  questions, the answers  to which
have a  history  and an  ever-evolving  politics.  If discussion  of racial,
sexual, and  economic-class  stratification  can posit "real"  answers  to
similar questions and nevertheless  produce entire volumes of serious,
canonical analysis, nothing of the kind is possible in arguments about
sexual  orientation.  The  definitional  ground  of  study  constantly
reasserts  itself as a source of uncertainty.
The  metaphysics  of  sexual  orientation  groups  and  their  subor-
dination are also anomalous, so that many of the assumptions  about
the caste-like  structure  that ensures the continued subordination  of
racial  and  ethic groups,  of  "the  poor,"  and  of  women  don't  work
when  the subject shifts to  sexual orientation.  We're not  discrete or
insular;  indeed,  the  worst  thing  about  us  may  be  that  we  are
everywhere.  We pass; and the moment we refuse  to pass, we recruit.
Our  parents  aren't  like  us  and  are,  in  many  cases,  our  first  and
primary oppressors.  If you can think about us without thinking about
what we do in bed, you're a better man than I.  And what  we do in
bed-or rather, the phantasmatic projection of what we do in bed-is
deeply  troubling  to many  people:  I  know  one lesbian whose  father
actually  threw up (and  then disinherited her) when she came  out to
him.  Finally, the differences  among us are manifold:  We appear  (or
hide) in every subordinated and superordinated group as more or less
unwelcome  infiltrators,  in  the  process  taking  on  strong  cultural
affinities with  these disparate  social locations;  some of us have  a lot
of  money  and  institutional  power  while  others  are  socially  mar-
ginalized and economically disabled; and those of us who are women
have chosen to disassociate from men to some degree, while those of
us who are men have made the same decision about women (on both
sides,  often,  with  great  ressentiment).  Just  try to  make  equivalent
statements  about  groups  subordinated  by  race,  ethnicity,  sex,  or
poverty.
The  strategic  pressure  to obscure  these  anomalies  is  tremendous,
and  explains  the  happiness  of  intersectional  claims  linking  sexual
orientation to supposedly more canonical identity systems.  It explains
why  the  first  wave  of  pro-gay  normative  arguments  claimed  that
[Vol. 8: 93
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sexual-orientation  subordination  is like race subordination,  and why
early pro-gay  legal arguments claimed  that anti-gay discrimination  is
like  race  discrimination.  More  recently,  race-based  claims  have
subsided  and  sex-based  claims  have  moved  to  the  fore:  Sexual-
orientation subordination  is said to be sex (or gender) subordination,
and  anti-gay  discrimination  is  said  to  be  sex  (or  gender)
discrimination.  Intersectionality is euphoric for pro-gay argument not
only  because  it  articulates  plausible  audiences  for  coalition  exhor-
tation, but more fundamentally because  it borrows systematicity from
forms  of  subordination  that  are  widely  understood  to  be  widely
understood,  and  from  forms  of  discrimination  that  get  heightened
scrutiny.
Claims of systematicity  made  in the  two lead  essays  of this  Sym-
posium  amply  exceed  the diffidence  one  expects  in  cases  of mere
strategic  manoeuvering,  however;  their  metaphysical  range  and
epistemological bravado  are so grand that I am tempted to call them
pre-post-structuralist.  Valdes  sets out not a conceptual model but a
history of the actual conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation
in systematic human interactions that we inherit directly from Athens
via Rome-the-capitol-of-the-Roman-Empire  and then Rome-the-Holy-
See.  His claim is  that a single "Euro-American  sex/gender  system"
has been transmitted, synchronically from metropole to periphery and
diachronically from metropole to metropole, in an unbroken chain of
cultural  causation  initiated  at  the  invention  of  agriculture  and
ultimately producing contemporary  childrearing practices and federal
judges'  blithe  refusal  to  take  seriously  the  Title  VII  claims  of
effeminate  men.  Morris  attributes  similar  structural  coherence  and
persistence  to  pre-contact  Hawai'i  and Hawaiianness:  He  claims  to
uncover in aikane bonds (traditional same-sex relationships  to which
he attributes  an erotic component  and which he  dubs "homogamy")
a  "central  cultural  pattern"1  of  "Hawai'i  [when  it]  was  pure
Hawai'i,"2 observes that "the hallmark of Hawaiian culture is the way
it continues and regenerates  itself," 3 and declares  that this systematic
persistence of Hawaiian  essences includes aikane relationships  which
"continue to this day" with all their original "validity"  and "Hawaiian-
ness."
4
What explains the bold sweep of these claims?  I think Morris and
Valdes  have  picked up  a historiographical  gauntlet thrown down  by
1.  Robert J.  Morris, Configuring the Bo(u)nds of Marriage: The Implications of Hawaiian
Culture  &  Values for the Debate About Homogamy, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.  105,  140 (1996).
2.  Id. at  111.
3.  Id. at  140.
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the Supreme  Court  in  Bowers v. Hardwick.  Hardwick invoked  the
history of sodomy regulation as  a source of and justification  for anti-
gay  normativity'  Morris  seeks  to  disable  the  Court's  logic  by
bringing  to  light  an  originary  moment in  which  one of the  United
States-Hawai'i---cherished  same-sex relationships.  Like the Supreme
Court Justices, he assumes  that past practices provide the normative
ground for the present; he disagrees only about what the relevant past
was.  Valdes,  who has  made  an  argument  like  Morris'  elsewhere,6
concentrates  here on a complementary  approach:  Sure, he concedes,
pretty early on Western Civilization monolithically condemned same-
sex sex, but its decision to do so was historically contingent and in any
event history is the nightmare from which liberalism bids us to awake.
However  different  their  legal  and  historical  claims  are  from  one
another and from the picture of the past set out in  Hardwick, Morris
and Valdes concede  two points that propel them towards grand  sys-
tematics:  Cultures  and  epochs,  as  such,  have  normative  views;  and
contemporary  legal  norms  can  be  recognized  as such  to  the  extent
that they repeat or deny past ones.
In  response  to  these  claims  both  Coombs  and  Harris  raise  the
hideous  specter of "law-office  history."  The emergence  of this term
at this juncture  should  be no  surprise:  It was invented  precisely  to
deal  with the problem posed  for legal-historical  standards when the
Supreme Court indicated that parties might win or lose constitutional
cases depending on whether they could prove up an  "original intent"
or  legal  "tradition"  favoring  their  claim.  It  would  be  a  mistake,
however, to suppose that Coombs and Harris ask only for a rehearsal
of the by-now  familiar criticism  that lawyers'  history  (including  the
history made by lawyers  who happen to be  Supreme Court Justices)
depends  on  "the  selection  of  data  favorable  to  the position  being
advanced  without  regard  to  or  concern  for  contradictory  data  or
proper  evaluation  of  the relevance  of the  data offered"; 7 that  it  is
generated  by  "legal  advocates"  who  "selectively  adduce  historical
evidence  to  support  their  clients'  positions"  while  foregoing  the
discipline of professional  historians, who strive "to control the extent
to  which  their  historical  understandings  are  shaped  by present  day
5.  The majority Justices said that Georgia's sodomy statute had "ancient roots," which Chief
Justice  Burger  traced  all  the way  back  to the beginnings  of "Western  Civilization";  and  the
majority went  on to hold that the Bill  of Rights  and the Fourteenth Amendment could hardly
protect conduct which the states ratifying them had criminalized.  Bowers v.  Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186,  192-96 (1986);  id. at  196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6.  See Francisco Valdes, Queers,  Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing  the Conflation
of "Sex,"  "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation"  in Euro-American Law and Culture, 83  CAL.  L.
REV. 1 (1995).
7.  Alfred H. Kelly,  Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. Cr. REV.  119,  122
n.13.
[Vol.  8: 93
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experiences and concerns";'  and that it therefore "reduces complexity
and  contradiction  to  simplicity  and  provides  a  story  in  which  all
evidence  points to a single conclusion."9
If only  that  were  all.  The  distinctive  tension  of this  Symposium
arises  because  it  drives  back  and  forth  across  a  double  intersec-
tion-across that spot on the conceptual  map where the intersections
among the Big Identities criss-cross the intersection between the legal
future and the legal past, between legal legitimacy and legal-historical
knowledge,  between  advocacy  and  historiography.  Thus  Coombs
diffidently  concludes  that  the  lead  essays  "appear  to  be  good  his-
tory"-a provisional  decision  she is content  to leave  at that-"  [but]
limited  history,  for  each  focuses  overwhelmingly  on  the  history  of
lovemaking  between  men."1   Where  are the  lesbians?  she  asks.
However  good or bad the history, Coombs insists, its success depends
on its utility to lesbians and gay men as we decide how persistently we
can  work  together  in  a  single  movement.  Coombs  asks  what  the
history of homosexuality  is history of, and proposes to test answers to
that question against strictly defined contemporary legal "interests."" 1
If  Coombs  objects  to  Valdes'  history  for  turning  the  gay
male/lesbian  flying  cloverleaf  into  a  simple  four-way  stop,  Harris
objects to Morris'  history for failing to see that colonial historiography
is a jacknifed tractor-trailer  blocking all four lanes in every direction.
Harris concludes that Morris' essay represents the "worst sort of 'law-
office  history"'  not  merely  because  Morris  "elid[es]  uncertainty,
ambiguity,  difficulties  of  translation"  (standard  objections  in  the
original-intent/constitutional-tradition  debates), but because  he does
so across a colonial boundary:  "[A]  historian dealing with  questions
of cultural difference in a colonial context must strive to acknowledge
and  to  undermine  the  very  culture-boundedness  that  makes  the
lawyer's  argument  so  persuasive  and  certain." 2   Though  Harris
states her belief that "the translation Morris argues for is possible,, 13
it must certainly be exceedingly  difficult.
Both Coombs and Harris complicate the problem of interested legal
history in two ways: They recognize that the relevant interests may be
multiple, intersecting,  in conflict; and  they point  to epistemological
8.  Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569,  1613
n.160 (1990).
9.  Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173,173
(1994).
10.  Mary  Coombs,  Between  Women/Between  Mern  The  Significance for Lesbianism of
Historical  Understandings  of Same-(Male)Sex Sexual Activities, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241, 242
(1996).
11.  Id.
12.  Angela P. Harris, Seductions of Modern Culture,  8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 213,229 (1996).
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undertows (lack of documentary history, orientalism) that may swamp
claims of historical knowledge in skepticism.  And yet for every "may
not"  and  "cannot"  in  Learned  Hand's  dismal  prognostication  for
interested legal history, Coombs and Harris  say "must":
You  may take  Martin  Luther  or Erasmus  for  your model,  but
you cannot play both roles at once;  you may not carry  a sword
beneath  a scholar's gown, or lead flaming causes from a cloister.
Luther cannot be domesticated in a university.  You cannot raise
the standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to relieve
injustice, and still keep an open mind to every disconcerting  fact,
or an open ear  to the cold voices of doubt.1
The question for a journal  of law and the humanities is whether and
how  interdisciplinary  work  can  manage  to  toggle  between  Hand's
"cannot"  and the  Symposiasts'  "must."
The  most  problematic  historical  and  political  gestures  in  the
following  pages  suggest  that performing  that toggle  well requires  a
firm  grasp on  a  thesis  borrowed  not from  historical  study but from
literary  criticism:  that  even  the  most pedestrian  truth-claim  links  a
speaker  and an audience  in a relationship  that is at least potentially,
and possibly  always actually, political.  (In How  To Do Things With
Words J.L.  Austin  destroyed  his own  distinction between  constative
and  performative  utterances-between  descriptive  statements  and
"speech  acts"-by relentlessly  testing brilliantly  classified  utterances
against this thesis.)  Dealing  carefully with the possibilities  raised  by
this thesis  can bring an interested legal-historical  scholar  into better
alignment with historical standards of proof and enable her to manage
the political complexities of interested representation, particularly at
the crossroads  travelled  by semi-autonomous  identities.
Consider, for instance, Valdes'  claim that Plato contributed an idea
to  "the  Greek  sex/gender  system"  that  was  crucial  to  the  triple
conflation he attributes to Euro-American  thought and social  life, to
wit, the conflation of sexual orientation with sex.  His text is the Sym-
posium,  in  particular  the  myth  in  which  Zeus  sliced  the  original
humans,  with  their  two  sets  of  genitals,  in  half,  committing  the
unhappy remnants  to seek  reunion by intercourse  with the  genitals
they  had  lost.15  Valdes'  implicit  claim  is  that  Plato's  intellectual
authority made this myth and its meaning  (sexual orientation  tracks
bodily sex) a central part of Western sexual systematics.  But as John
Milton  advised,  "The author  is  ever distinguisht  from the  person he
14.  LEARNED  HAND,  On Receiving an Honorary Degree, in THE  SPIRIT OF LIBERTY  134,
138 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d  ed. 1974).
15.  Francisco  Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:  Tracing  the Conflation of Sex, Gender,
and Sexual Orientation  to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.  161,  197  (1996).
[Vol. 8:  93
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introduces.' 16  The  myth  isn't  Plato's  really;  it's  Aristophanes';  or
rather, Plato in  the  Symposium attributes  it to a  fictional  represen-
tation  of the historical figure Aristophanes  as he  is reported to have
spoken at the supposed banquet. 7  Of course if any of the  speakers
at  the  banquet  are  to  be  read  for  Plato's  "meaning"  it  would  be
Socrates,  but  we  have  Socrates'  speech  about  love  at  a quadruple
remove:  Socrates  gained  his  understanding  of  love  (which  he
characteristically  refused  to insist was  a "truth")  in  a dialogue  with
Diotima, which  he reported to the banqueters  second hand; and we
have even that only because Aristodemus, who attended the banquet,
reported what was said and done there  to Apollodorus, and because
Apollodorus,  years  later  and  unsure  of  his  memory  but  having
checked  everything  with  Socrates,  recited  what  he remembered  to
Glaucon, and because Apollodorus eventually reported  his report to
Glaucon to whomever is supposed to have committed the Symposium
to paper.'"  At  least, that is  what the  text  of the Symposium would
have us believe about its provenance.
The  Symposium  is  not  (as  Valdes  suggests)  a  "tract,"  but  a
dialogue, one that worries the relationship between meaning, speech,
and writing until it is an open sore.  If the myth "means"  anything, it
does  so  only  as  an  utterance  made  in  a  politically  complex  and
dynamic scene.  And there remains the question of its concrete social
effects:  Are  they more  simple  than its  meaning?  Valdes  thinks  so:
"Plato specified  a direct connection  between sex  and sexuality.  This
idea pervades subsequent Euro-American discourse.  The path to full
conflation  was thus  set." 9  But surely  a  text as scandalous,  obscure,
and  canonical  as  the  Symposium  has  obtained  concrete  effects  in
Western  intellectual  life  and  social  organization  only  at  specific
historical moments; surely to identify and understand those moments
one  needs  to  worry  about  the  social  and  political  structure  of  its
audience,  and  the  power  of  its  audience  to  mold  new  social  and
intellectual  traditions;  and  surely  the  difficult  structure  of  the  text
must have  made at  least occasional  contributions  to that  reception.
Surely  the Symposium's  representation  of  how  meaning  is  socially
transmitted understates  the complexity of its own  transmission.
Harris objects that Morris reads the textual record  of pre-contact
Hawaiian  culture  with little more attention to its origin  in Western,
literate transcription  of native, oral tradition than Valdes gives to the
16.  JOHN  MILTON,  An  Apology Against a Pamphlet Call'd a Modest Confutation of the
Animadiversions upon the Remonstration Against Smectymnuus, in Complete Prose Works of
John Milton 862, 888 (Don  M. Wolfe ed., 1953)  (1642).
17.  PLATO,  THE  SYMPOSIUM  59-65  (Walter Hamilton  trans., Penguin  Books 1951).
18.  Id. at 33-35,  79-95.
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literary structure of the Symposium.2°  But Morris locates himself not
only outside native Hawaiian culture in order to usher it into "United
States law," 2  but  also inside it:  He calls upon us to accept his claims
about pre-contact  aikane relationships  out of deference  to his iden-
tification  with the racially and nationally subordinated  culture which
he describes.  The issue  becomes  not just the speech  act in the. text
under examination, but the speech  act involved in scholarly  descrip-
tion of it:  Morris'  authorial  persona is  under construction  here.  He
concludes that a mythic pre-contact aikane relationship was "a family
and  a  marriage"  on  the  strength  of  an  obscure  passage  which  he
describes  as "the plainest possible language";22 he concludes  that the
same relationship  involved same-sex erotic contact on the basis  of a
song  which  Morris  declines  to  quote,  advising  us  instead  that
"Everyone should read  at least the  complete  translation,  better still
the  original  Hawaiian";'  and  he  substantiates  the  "persistence  of
aikane values  in modem  times"  by reference  to  performances  and
scholarship that he does not cite, referring us instead to the persuasive
impact they had on him and not doubt would have  on us if we were
there. 24  Morris'  legal  argument  is  that  aikane relationships  have
necessary implications for the analysis of sodomy laws and the bar on
same-sex marriage because  they were marital, they were sexual, and
they persist;'  this fact throws the moments in which Morris emerges
as  a  knower  and  teller  whom  we  should  trust  into  considerable
prominence.  The systematicity of native culture in Morris'  represen-
tation of it permeates  his presentation of himself as its spokesperson:
He  has  its  "Hawaiianness"  and  thus  its  coherence,  "validity,"  and
authority. The problem for multiply intersectional work raised by this
knowledge  claim  is not  whether Morris  is  entitled  to insider  status,
but whether insider status is itself a sufficient evidence for historical
conclusions.
Simplification  of the  object of study and  of the subject  doing the
studying doesn't strengthen the legal leverage  and political appeal  of
the resulting scholarship-if anything it weakens them.  Systematicity
in  Valdes'  article  produces  a  coalition  exhortation  to heterosexual
women  and  "sexual  minorities,"  particularly  lesbians,  gay  men,
bisexuals,  transsexuals,  and  bi/transgendered  or  socially  gender-
20.  Harris, supra note  12, at  220-26.
21.  Morris, supra note 1, at 139.
22.  Id. at 145.
23.  Id. at  145 n.185.
24.  Id. at 141.
25.  The third point must  be established  if aikane relationships  are  to fall  within  the reach
of  a  clause  of the  Hawa'ii  constitution  protecting  some  native  cultural  customs  from  state
regulation.  See id. at  117.
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atypical people. 26  In a call for coalition that is also a  call for papers,
Valdes predicts that future "excavations inevitably will further unpack
the  common  interest  in  the  dismantling  of  hetero-patriarchal
structures that is shared by women and by sexual minorities."27  The
coalition invoked  here will remain an  "us"  only if these excavations
reconfirm Valdes's findings, and its not at all clear that they will.  At
least  one  of  the  sexual  minorities  Valdes  includes  in  his
coalition-transsexuals, particularly male-to-female transsexuals-have
entered onto the political scene insisting that gender is conflated with
bodily  sex.'  Not  only  have  they  disagreed  with  feminists  and
lesbian  feminists about  the  social construction  of gender;  they  have
actually insisted that they like that crucial premise of Valdes' hetero-
patriarchy.  The thesis that truth-claims  link speakers with audiences
in  complex  ways  would  be  most  useful  to  anyone  seeking  to
understand  and  negotiate  this  resulting  conflict  within  Valdes'
coalition.
Morris encounters a parallel problem, grounded less in his descrip-
tion  of  Hawaiian  culture  as  systematic  than  in  his  derivation  of
authority  from  it.  In  an  ominous  passage,  he  rebukes  (Western?)
(lesbian?)  (feminists?)  who  object to the  decision to make marriage
a  top  priority  of  the  pro-gay  legal  agenda  by  invoking  his  iden-
tification with Hawaiian  systematicity  and their shared  validity:  The
concept of love registered in  the native term aloha "is central to the
same-sex relationship; the denial of same-sex marriage chills this love.
Those who argue that 'same-sex love doesn't need a marriage license'
are wrong in a profoundly Hawaiian sense." 29  As a truth-claim  this
is  far  from  self-evident;  as  a  speech  act  managing  a  relationship
between a truth-claim, a speaker, and an audience, it is quite abrupt,
a gesture of subaltern authoritarianism.
Doubly  intersectional  work-that  is,  work  examining  the  inter-
relationships among semi-autonomous  systems of social stratification
and  seeking  links  between  their  cultural  history  and  their  legal
future-is in  its  infancy.  I  can  think  of no  academic  project more
compelling  or more difficult.  The articles and comments  here make
a strong claim that sexual orientation, with all its epistemological and
metaphysical  oddities,  belongs  on  the  agenda  of  intersectional
scholars.  And  they  make  it  clear  that  the  issue  facing  law-and-
humanities work within that project is not just what the intersections
26.  Valdes, supra note 15, at 163 nn.7-8.
27.  Id. at 212.
28.  See  MARJORIE  GARBER,  VESTED  INTERESTS:  CROSS-DRESSING  AND  CULTURAL
ANXIETY  93-117  (1992).
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are, but how they can be apprehended  and described-and how our
answers  to  those  questions  establish  new  cultural  forms  for  our
current legal  and political interactions.
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss1/5